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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal involves one of the many second or 
successive motions for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 that have been filed in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 
(2015).  Johnson invalidated the “residual clause” of the 
definition of “violent felony” found in the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (the “ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  
Anthony Mayo is currently serving a twenty-three year term 
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of imprisonment for a 2001 conviction, imposed under the 
ACCA’s recidivist enhancement provision, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(1).  He was convicted of being a felon in possession 
of a firearm, and his sentence was enhanced based on his 
having committed three prior offenses that the District Court 
treated as violent felonies under the ACCA.  Those predicate 
offenses, all under Pennsylvania law, are an aggravated 
assault, for which he was convicted in 1993, and two 
robberies, for which he was convicted in 1993 and 1994.  
Mayo argues that, in light of Johnson, his sentence is now 
unconstitutional because none of his prior convictions were 
for crimes that qualify as a “violent felony” as defined in the 
ACCA. 
 
The District Court rejected Mayo’s Johnson claim, 
concluding that each of the convictions in question was 
indeed for a violent felony and hence a predicate for 
enhancing his sentence.  At least as to the aggravated assault 
conviction, however, the Court erred.  That conviction was 
under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(1), which prohibits 
“attempt[ing] to cause serious bodily injury to another, or 
caus[ing] such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 
value of human life[.]”  As Pennsylvania interprets 
§ 2702(a)(1), it does not necessarily involve the element of 
physical force required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the ACCA.  Thus, at least one of the convictions that the 
District Court relied on to enhance Mayo’s sentence does not 
qualify as a violent felony, and we will vacate and remand for 
further proceedings. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
Being a felon in possession, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1), is an offense that typically carries a maximum 
penalty of ten years’ imprisonment.  Id. § 924(a)(2).1  But the 
ACCA ups the ante.  It states that “a person who violates 
section 922(g) … and has three previous convictions … for a 
violent felony … committed on occasions different from one 
another, … shall be fined … and imprisoned not less than 
fifteen years[.]”  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  The statute defines 
“violent felony” as “any crime punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year … that [A] has as an element 
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another; or [B] is burglary, arson, or 
extortion, involves use of explosives, or [C] otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another[.]”  Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).  The three 
alternative clauses, labeled here as [A], [B], and [C], are 
commonly referred to, respectively, as the force or elements 
clause, the enumerated offenses clause, and the residual 
clause.  As none of Mayo’s predicate offenses is listed in the 
enumerated offenses clause, we are concerned here only with 
whether his ACCA-enhanced sentence was based on the now-
unconstitutional residual clause or the elements clause. 
                                              
1 Specifically, § 922(g) provides, in pertinent part, that 
“[i]t shall be unlawful for any person--(1) who has been 
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year … to … possess 
… any firearm[.]”  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Section 924 then 
provides that a person violating § 922(g) “shall be fined as 
provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or 
both.”  Id. § 924(a)(2). 
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 1.  Mayo’s 2001 Felon-In-Possession  
   Conviction 
  
In late 2000, a grand jury returned a five-count 
indictment against Mayo and a coconspirator, alleging that 
the pair had used guns in connection with several drug 
trafficking offenses.2  The indictment included the felon-in-
possession charge leading to the sentence presently at issue, 
and it also recited Mayo’s 1993 Pennsylvania aggravated 
assault conviction and his 1993 and 1994 Pennsylvania 
robbery convictions.  Pursuant to a written agreement, Mayo 
pled guilty to the gun charge and acknowledged that, based 
on § 924(e), he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 
fifteen years’ imprisonment, with a maximum of life 
imprisonment.  At the plea hearing, the government 
represented that Mayo had three prior convictions that 
qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA.  Prior to 
accepting his plea, the District Court confirmed that Mayo 
had unlawfully possessed a firearm and that he had been 
convicted of the aggravated assault and robbery crimes listed 
in the indictment.  The Court also reiterated that he faced a 
fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence.   
 
The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) 
discussed the offense of conviction and provided further 
details on Mayo’s three earlier convictions.3  Then, applying 
                                              
2 We address solely the claims pertaining to Mayo’s 
motion as set forth in the certificate of appealability. 
 
3 Although not listed in the PSR, it is undisputed that 
Mayo’s predicate convictions were for Pennsylvania 
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the 2000 version of the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(the “guidelines”), it set forth Mayo’s offense level as 31 and 
his criminal history as category VI, yielding a guidelines 
imprisonment range of 188-235 months.  Mayo did not file 
any objections to the PSR.   
 
At his 2001 sentencing, Mayo conceded “the specific 
factual allegations attributed to [him],” which were “almost 
identical” to what he had acknowledged at the plea hearing.  
(App. at 72.)  He also said that the criminal history was 
correct.  The District Court ultimately adopted the PSR’s 
findings and issued a sentence based on the ACCA 
enhancement.  The sentence issued without specification of 
whether the Court was relying on the elements clause or the 
residual clause.4  The Court sentenced Mayo to a twenty-three 
year (276-month) term of incarceration, which exceeded the 
recommended guidelines range.  In the Court’s view, Mayo 
demonstrated “a strong likelihood of recidivism,” (App. at 
87), and an upward departure was warranted because his 
criminal history significantly underrepresented the 
seriousness and extent of his past crimes, and his offense 
level failed to account for the risk he posed by carrying a 
“high capacity semi-automatic firearm,” (App. at 88).  Mayo 
                                                                                                     
aggravated assault, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 2702(a)(1), and robbery, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§  3701(a)(1)(ii).  In a letter to the parties, dated October 26, 
2016, the District Court summarized the state court records 
identifying those subsections, which neither party contests. 
 
4 Again, no one at any stage has contended that the 
enumerated offenses clause is in play. 
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appealed his sentence, but we affirmed.  United States v. 
Mayo, 59 F. App’x 457 (3d Cir. 2003).     
 
 2. Mayo’s § 2255 Motions 
 
Mayo later filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to 
vacate or correct his sentence.  The District Court denied the 
motion, and we declined to issue a certificate of appealability.   
 
A decade later, in 2016, the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Johnson, invalidating the residual clause of the 
ACCA as unconstitutionally vague.  It subsequently declared 
that ruling retroactive in Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
1257, 1268 (2016).  Based on Johnson, Mayo filed a second 
§ 2255 motion seeking resentencing, and, as required by 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2255, he sought permission from us to 
pursue that second effort at post-conviction relief.  We 
granted his request, stating that Mayo “ha[d] made a prima 
facie showing that his proposed § 2255 motion contains a 
new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on 
collateral review by the Supreme Court that was previously 
unavailable.”  (App. at 112.) 
 
In his second § 2255 motion, Mayo argued that his 
prior conviction for aggravated assault and his two prior 
convictions for robbery no longer qualify as violent felonies 
after Johnson invalidated the residual clause, and therefore 
that his ACCA-based sentence violates his due process rights.  
Specifically, he contended that he had already served the ten-
year statutory maximum sentence that would have applied but 
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for the ACCA enhancement.5  The government responded 
with a motion to dismiss, saying that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction because Mayo failed to establish that he is 
entitled to proceed on a second § 2255 motion, as he had not 
established that his sentence was based on the residual clause 
such that Johnson even applies.  The government also argued, 
on the merits, that Mayo’s convictions still qualify as violent 
felonies under the ACCA’s elements clause. 
 
The District Court agreed with that latter argument, 
and it denied Mayo’s motion on the merits, without 
addressing the jurisdictional challenge.  It rejected his 
argument that Pennsylvania’s aggravated assault statute, 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(1), lacks the requisite element of 
force necessary for a conviction under it to categorically 
constitute a violent felony.  Reviewing the facts as to the 
aggravated assault conviction, the Court noted that Mayo had 
“hit [the victim] on the head with a brick, punched and kicked 
[the victim] while lying on the ground, and hit [the victim] 
with a glass bottle[.]”  (App. at 8-9.)   
 
Turning to the robbery convictions, the Court likewise 
rejected Mayo’s legal arguments and noted that, in the first 
robbery conviction, Mayo “had an unidentifiable object in his 
hand and told the victim, I’ll blow your head off, get down,” 
and in the second, he had “held a gun to [the victim] and 
ordered her to open the safe.”  (App. at 10 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).)  It concluded that those 
“facts, which were not objected to by Mayo,” were sufficient 
                                              
5 Mayo represents that he has been in federal custody 
since October 4, 2001, and therefore, has already served more 
than ten years in prison.   
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to meet the ACCA’s elements clause.  (App. at 9-10; see also 
id. at 9 n.1, 10 n.2 (noting its reliance on uncontroverted facts 
in the presentence report as a “Shepard document”).)     
 
Mayo appealed.  We granted a certificate of 
appealability to address “whether [Mayo’s] due process rights 
were violated by the use of his Pennsylvania aggravated 
assault and robbery convictions to enhance his sentence under 
the [ACCA].”  (App. at 13-14 (citing Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 
2557; Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1268; Mathis v. United States, 136 
S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016)).) 
 
II. DISCUSSION6 
 
Mayo’s primary challenge on appeal is that neither his 
aggravated assault conviction nor his robbery convictions 
constitute violent felonies under the ACCA’s elements clause, 
the only clause left after eliminating the enumerated offenses 
clause, which no one says is relevant, and the now-defunct 
residual clause.  Mayo asserts that none of the supposed 
predicate offenses categorically require the “use of physical 
force against the person of another.”  (Opening Br. 16, 23.)  
Accordingly, he argues, the District Court violated his due 
                                              
6 The District Court’s jurisdiction is disputed.  Our 
jurisdiction is uncontested and is based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 
and 2253(a).  Whether the District Court properly exercised 
jurisdiction over Mayo’s second § 2255 motion and whether 
his prior convictions constitute violent felonies under the 
ACCA are questions of law, which we review de novo.  
United States v. Peppers, --- F.3d ---, 2018 WL 3827213, at 
*5 (3d Cir. Aug. 13, 2018). 
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process rights by “sentenc[ing] him beyond the otherwise 
applicable [ten]-year statutory maximum,” and he is entitled 
to relief under § 2255.  (Opening Br. at 12.)  The government 
disagrees and counters that the District Court should have 
dismissed Mayo’s second § 2255 motion for lack of 
jurisdiction, because “Mayo did not establish that his 
enhanced sentence …was based solely on those convictions 
qualifying as violent felonies under the residual clause.”7  
(Answering Br. at 14.)  We thus begin with the threshold 
question of whether the District Court had jurisdiction over 
Mayo’s claim, and we conclude that it did. 
 
A. Jurisdiction 
 
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), 
a defendant in federal custody generally may file only one 
motion collaterally attacking his sentence on the grounds that 
it was imposed in violation of the Constitution or federal law.  
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), (b), (h).  A prisoner may not pursue a 
second or successive motion unless the Court of Appeals 
certifies that the motion relies on either “newly discovered 
evidence” showing innocence or, as asserted in this case, that 
it relies on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive 
to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 
previously unavailable.”  Id. § 2255(h).  To gain that 
                                              
7 The Department of Justice has since stated that it no 
longer views the threshold requirements of § 2255 as 
jurisdictional.  We nevertheless addressed and rejected the 
government’s jurisdictional argument and held that those 
requirements are indeed jurisdictional.  See Peppers, 2018 
WL 3827213 at *6 n.3. 
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certification, the prisoner has to make at least a prima facie 
showing that one of those two gatekeeping requirements has 
been met.  Id. § 2244(b)(3). 
 
We recently addressed those gatekeeping requirements 
in United States v. Peppers, --- F.3d ---, 2018 WL 3827213, 
at *5-*9 (3d Cir. Aug. 13, 2018).  We explained that “even 
after we authorize a second or successive petition, § 2244 still 
requires the district court to ‘dismiss any claim presented in a 
second or successive application … unless the applicant 
shows that the claim satisfies [those] requirements[.]’”  Id. at 
*5 (first and third alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(4)); see also id. at *6 (stating that district courts are 
not bound by our “preliminary examination”).  District courts 
must conduct an independent analysis of whether a § 2255 
movant has made that showing, before reaching the merits of 
a second or successive motion.  Id. 
 
Although we agree that the District Court here erred by 
failing to assess its jurisdiction, the record nevertheless 
establishes that Mayo met the “new rule of constitutional 
law” gatekeeping requirement and therefore that jurisdiction 
was proper.  A prisoner satisfies that requirement when he 
establishes “that his sentence may be unconstitutional in light 
of a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the 
Supreme Court.”  Id.  In Peppers, we held that the movant 
need only “show that it is possible he was sentenced under the 
now-unconstitutional residual clause of the ACCA,” id. at *8, 
and that he “may require resentencing,” id. at *7, as when a 
sentencing court did not specify which ACCA clause it relied 
on and the record does not otherwise include evidence 
establishing that the residual clause was not implicated, id. at 
*9. 
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Mayo has made that showing.  As he correctly points 
out, the sentencing court did not specify under which clause 
his earlier offenses qualified as ACCA violent felonies.  
Moreover, the government does not direct us to any evidence 
in the record establishing that the residual clause was not 
relied on by the District Court.  We therefore conclude that 
Mayo’s sentence may have been based on the residual clause, 
and thus that the District Court had jurisdiction to review the 
merits of his second § 2255 motion.   
 
B. Mayo’s Aggravated Assault Conviction 
 
We now turn to the parties’ dispute over whether 
Mayo’s aggravated assault conviction under 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 2702(a)(1) is categorically a violent felony under the 
ACCA’s elements clause.  According to Mayo, the District 
Court committed three errors in concluding that it is.  First, he 
argues that the Court impermissibly relied on the underlying 
facts “to establish that his aggravated assault conviction fell 
within the [elements] clause.”  (Opening Br. 13, 21.)  Next, 
he argues that aggravated assault as defined in Pennsylvania 
law lacks the element of physical force required by the 
ACCA.  Finally, he argues that the minimum mens rea under 
§ 2702(a)(1) is also categorically insufficient under the 
ACCA.  We agree with his second argument and conclude 
that aggravated assault under Pennsylvania’s § 2702(a)(1) 
does not categorically require the use of physical force 
against another. 
 
1. The Categorical Approach 
 
 13 
When classifying a prior conviction under the ACCA, 
we begin with the “categorical approach,” which requires a 
comparative analysis based solely on the elements of the 
crime of conviction contrasted with the elements of a generic 
version of that offense.  Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2247-48.  In this 
case, we compare aggravated assault as described in 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2702 with the definition of “violent felony” set 
forth in the elements clause of the ACCA.  As recently 
reiterated in United States v. Ramos, 892 F.3d 599 (3d Cir. 
2018),8 however, the categorical approach to reviewing a 
predicate conviction may be modified under certain 
conditions, namely when the statute at issue is divisible and 
when the record, based on so-called Shephard documents, 
establishes that a particular subsection of the statute is the 
basis of conviction.9  Id. at 606-07.  If those two conditions 
are met, then the modified categorical approach allows a 
court to assess whether a conviction under that particular 
statutory subsection would categorically qualify as a predicate 
offense under the ACCA.  Id.; see also Descamps v. United 
States, 570 U.S. 254, 258 (2013) (clarifying that “sentencing 
courts may not apply the modified categorical approach when 
the crime of which the defendant was convicted has a single, 
indivisible set of elements”). 
 
                                              
8 We apply current case law when reviewing the merits 
of Mayo’s motion.  Peppers, 2018 WL 3827213. at *11. 
 
9 See generally, Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 
16 (2005) (listing examples of documents that courts may 
consider when applying the modified categorical approach). 
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As to the first condition, Mayo acknowledges that 
Pennsylvania’s aggravated assault statute “appears to be a 
divisible statute, setting forth separate elements … for 
committing the crime.”  (Opening Br. 16.)  The second 
condition is also satisfied.  The parties do not dispute the 
District Court’s determination, based on the record, that 
Mayo was convicted of violating § 2702(a)(1).   
 
Thus, we proceed to consider whether an aggravated 
assault conviction under § 2702(a)(1) categorically 
constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA’s elements 
clause.  When considering that question, we must “ignore the 
actual manner in which the defendant committed the prior 
offense” and “presume that the defendant did so by engaging 
in no more than ‘the minimum conduct criminalized by the 
state statute.’”10  Ramos, 892 F.3d at 606 (quoting Moncrieffe 
v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 191 (2013)).  We have said that 
“[t]his academic focus on a hypothetical offender’s 
hypothetical conduct is not, however, an ‘invitation to apply 
legal imagination’ to the statute of conviction.”  Id. (quoting 
Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191).  “Rather, there must be legal 
authority establishing that there is a ‘realistic probability, not 
a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute 
to conduct’” that falls outside of the ACCA’s definition of 
violent felony.  Id. (quoting Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191).   
 
                                              
10 To the extent the District Court may have relied on 
the underlying record to do more than pinpoint the specific 
statutory subsection under which the prior conviction was 
obtained, it strayed from the permissible bounds of the 
modified categorical approach. 
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2. The ACCA’s Element of “Physical 
 Force” 
 
The parties dispute whether a Pennsylvania aggravated 
assault conviction under § 2702(a)(1) categorically requires 
“as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another,” as is necessary 
to constitute a violent felony under the ACCA’s elements 
clause. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).  We conclude that it does 
not, because the text of the statute and Pennsylvania case law 
construing it establish that a conviction under § 2702(a)(1) 
does not necessarily require proof that a defendant engaged in 
any affirmative use of “physical force” against another 
person. 
 
As used in the ACCA, the words “physical force” have 
a particular meaning.  In another case called Johnson v. 
United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (“Johnson 2010”), the 
Supreme Court stated that the common understanding of the 
word “physical” refers to “force exerted by and through 
concrete bodies,” which “distinguish[es] physical force from, 
for example, intellectual force or emotional force.”  Id. at 
138.  It stated that the word “force” means “[p]ower, 
violence, or pressure directed against a person or thing,” and 
“physical force” means “[f]orce consisting in a physical act,” 
such as “a violent act directed against a robbery victim.”  Id. 
at 139 (alterations in original) (quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary 717 (9th ed. 2009)).  The Court, mindful that it 
was interpreting the term “physical force” in the context of 
the ACCA’s “statutory category of ‘violent felon[ies],’” id. at 
140 (alteration in original) (citation omitted), rejected the 
specialized common-law meaning of the word “force,” which 
could be satisfied by a mere unwanted touch, id. at 139.  It 
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explained that “the use of physical force against another 
person (or the risk of having to use such force in committing 
a crime), suggests a category of violent, active crimes[.]”  Id. 
at 140 (quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004)).  
Thus, it concluded, the ACCA’s “phrase ‘physical force’ 
means violent force—that is, force capable of causing 
physical pain or injury to another person.”  Id. 
 
That definition of “physical force” is controlling and is 
what we compare to Pennsylvania’s “determination of the 
elements of [the predicate offense].”  Id. at 138.  To constitute 
a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA, then, a conviction 
for aggravated assault under § 2702(a)(1) must require as an 
element the use, or threatened use, of violent force capable of 
causing physical pain or injury against the person of another. 
 
At the time of Mayo’s felony conviction under 
§ 2702(a)(1), that statutory subsection provided as follows: 
 
A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: 
 
(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to 
another, or causes such injury intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life[.] 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(1) (1993); see also id. § 2702(b) 
(“Aggravated assault under subsection (a)(1) … is a felony of 
the first degree.”).11  As Mayo points out, § 2702(a)(1) does 
                                              
11 When applying the modified categorical approach, 
as is so with “the categorical approach, we look to the 
 17 
                                                                                                     
elements of the statute as it existed at the time of the prior 
conviction,” Ramos, 892 F.3d at 608 n.35 (quoting United 
States v. Dahl, 833 F.3d 345, 355 (3d Cir. 2016)).  The full 
text of § 2702(a) provided as follows: 
 
(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of aggravated 
assault if he: 
 
(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to 
another, or causes such injury intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life; 
 
(2) attempts to cause or intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly causes serious 
bodily injury to a police officer, firefighter, 
county adult probation or parole officer, 
county juvenile probation or parole officer 
or an agent of the Pennsylvania Board of 
Probation and Parole in the performance of 
duty or to an employee of an agency, 
company or other entity engaged in public 
transportation, while in the performance of 
duty; 
 
(3) attempts to cause or intentionally or 
knowingly causes bodily injury to a police 
officer, firefighter or county adult probation 
or parole officer, county juvenile probation 
or parole officer or an agent of the 
 18 
not, on its face, include an element of “physical force”; rather, 
it focuses on whether a person causes, or attempts to cause 
“serious bodily injury.”  “Serious bodily injury” is defined as 
“[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or 
which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted 
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
organ.”  Id. § 2301.   
 
                                                                                                     
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole 
in the performance of duty; 
 
(4) attempts to cause or intentionally or 
knowingly causes bodily injury to another 
with a deadly weapon; or 
 
(5) attempts to cause or intentionally or 
knowingly causes bodily injury to a teaching 
staff member, school board member, other 
employee or student of any elementary or 
secondary publicly-funded educational 
institution, any elementary or secondary 
private school licensed by the Department of 
Education or any elementary or secondary 
parochial school while acting in the scope of 
his or her employment or because of his or 
her employment relationship to the school. 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702 (1993).  We note, however, the text 
of § 2702(a)(1) is the same today as it was in 1993, when 
Mayo was convicted under that subsection.  Compare 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(1) (2018), with 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 2702(a)(1) (1993). 
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Mayo argues, and we must agree, that “[p]hysical 
force and bodily injury are not the same thing,” (Opening Br. 
16), at least not as interpreted by Pennsylvania courts.  The 
case of Commonwealth v. Thomas, 867 A.2d 594 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2005), is instructive.  In Thomas, the defendant was 
convicted of first-degree aggravated assault under 
§ 2702(a)(1) after she starved her four-year-old son to death.  
Id. at 597.  On appeal, she argued that “the evidence was not 
sufficient to sustain her conviction because the 
Commonwealth failed to demonstrate either the use of force 
or the threat of force.”  Id.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court 
rejected that argument, saying that “evidence of the use of 
force or the threat of force is not an element of the crime of 
aggravated assault.”  Id.; see also id. (stating that the 
defendant cited no case law “demonstrate[ing] that 
Pennsylvania Courts have ever required proof of the use of 
force or the threat of force to sustain a conviction for 
aggravated assault”).  Instead, the court concluded that the 
evidence presented was sufficient to establish that the 
defendant “did cause[] serious bodily injury to [her son], 
resulting in his death by starvation.”  Id. at 602. 
 
Far from being a flight of imagination into extreme 
hypotheticals, our effort to understand how Pennsylvania 
actually applies its aggravated assault statute shows that 
convictions under § 2702(a)(1) have been upheld not because 
a defendant used physical force against the victim, but 
because serious bodily injury occurred, as with the deliberate 
failure to provide food or medical care.  Id. at 597; see also 
Commonwealth v. Taylor, No. CP-63-CR-0000827-2012, 
2015 WL 7576457, at *1, *6 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 9, 2015) 
(affirming conviction under § 2702(a)(1) for defendant’s 
“criminal neglect” of her twin six-year-old children, which 
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included failing to feed and clothe them).  Those cases 
support Mayo’s argument that, under § 2702(a)(1),12 
aggravated assault in Pennsylvania depends upon “the 
causation or attempted causation of … serious bodily injury,” 
(Opening Br. 16), regardless of whether that injury was 
caused by the defendant’s use or attempted use of physical 
force against the victim. 
 
The government nevertheless contends that causing or 
attempting to cause serious bodily injury necessarily involves 
the use of physical force.  Like the District Court, it relies on 
United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014), and in 
particular, the Supreme Court’s statement that “‘bodily 
injury’ must result from ‘physical force.’”  (Answering Br. 25 
(quoting Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1414).)  See also 
Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1414 (concluding that a conviction 
under a Tennessee statute prohibiting “the knowing or 
intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the 
use of physical force”).  The government’s argument fails 
because Castleman avowedly did not contemplate the 
question before us. 
 
In Castleman, the Court was addressing whether the 
“knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury” satisfies 
                                              
12 Mayo pushes his argument too far, however, when 
he claims that none of the subsections of § 2702(a) requires 
the requisite element of physical force.  That broad assertion 
is foreclosed by Ramos, in which we held that a conviction 
under subsection (a)(4), aggravated assault with a deadly 
weapon, “is categorically a crime of violence under the 
elements clause of the [g]uidelines.”  892 F.3d at 610-12; see 
also 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(4). 
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“the common-law concept of ‘force.’”  Id. at 1414.  It 
expressly reserved the question of whether causing “bodily 
injury” necessarily involves the use of “violent force” under 
the ACCA.  Id.  The Court was specifically considering 
examples of causing bodily injury through “the knowing or 
intentional application of force,” which it went on to say 
could be applied directly, “as with a kick or punch,” or 
indirectly, as in “the act of employing poison knowingly as a 
device to cause physical harm.”  Id. at 1415.  It was in that 
context that the Court concluded, “[i]t is impossible to cause 
bodily injury without applying force in the common-law 
sense.”  Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 1414 (noting that 
the element of “force” in common-law battery “need not be 
applied directly to the body of the victim” (citation 
omitted)).13  The Court having reserved the question, it is 
clear that Castleman did not answer whether causing serious 
bodily injury without any affirmative use of force would 
satisfy the violent physical force requirement of the ACCA.  
See United States v. Middleton, 883 F.3d 485, 491 (4th Cir. 
2018) (stating that “Castleman does not support the 
                                              
13 In Castleman, the Court also concluded that “the 
knowing or intentional application of force is a ‘use’ of force” 
under Leocal, acknowledging that “the word ‘use’ conveys 
the idea that the thing used … has been made the user’s 
instrument.”  134 S. Ct. at 1415 (citation omitted).  For that 
additional reason, it rejected the defendant’s argument that 
“sprinkl[ing] poison in a victim’s drink” does not involve the 
use of force.  Id.  Rather, the Court explained, regardless of 
whether the harm occurred indirectly, the “use of force” is 
“the act of employing poison knowingly as a device to cause 
physical harm.”  Id. 
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[g]overnment’s argument that any form of bodily injury 
requires violent force”). 
 
Nor is our case law relying on Castleman dispositive 
of the issue before us.  In United States v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 
129 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1582 (2018), we 
considered whether a conviction under the federal criminal 
threat statute, 18 U.S.C. § 876(c), which requires “knowingly 
mailing a communication containing a threat to injure the 
person of the addressee or of another,” constitutes a crime of 
violence under the guidelines.  Id. at 136.  Relying on 
Castleman, we rejected the defendant’s argument that 
“indirect applications of harm fall outside of the [g]uidelines’ 
ambit.”  Id. at 135-36.  Instead, we concluded that “‘use’ of 
physical force, as used in § 4B1.2(a)(1) [of the guidelines], 
involves the intentional employment of something capable of 
causing physical pain or injury to another person, regardless 
of whether the perpetrator struck the victim’s body.”  Id. at 
133.   
 
More recently, in Ramos, we relied on Castleman 
when concluding that a Pennsylvania conviction for 
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under § 2702(a)(4), 
“necessarily involves the use of physical force” because it 
“similarly requires proving the attempted, knowing, or 
intentional causation of bodily injury[.]”14  892 F.3d at 612 
                                              
14 The Second Circuit recently reached a similar 
conclusion in Villanueva v. United States, 893 F.3d 123, 129 
(2d Cir. 2018) (relying on Castleman to conclude that first-
degree assault with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument 
under Connecticut law, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-59(a)(1), 
constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA, explaining that 
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(citation omitted).  We reasoned that “it is nearly impossible 
to conceive of a scenario in which a person could knowingly 
or intentionally injure, or attempt to injure, another person 
with a deadly weapon without engaging in at least some 
affirmative, forceful conduct.”  Id.  Moreover, we highlighted 
that “[the defendant] cite[d] no authorities establishing that an 
offender’s inaction alone would be sufficient to sustain a 
§ 2702(a)(4) conviction,” and we expressly acknowledged but 
distinguished Thomas because it involved “only a conviction 
for first-degree aggravated assault under § 2702(a)(1)—a 
wholly separate criminal offense containing materially 
different elements than the offense at issue.”  Id. 
 
So although we have concluded that there are some 
statutorily-defined offenses in Pennsylvania that forbid 
causing or threatening to cause “bodily injury” and that 
inherently involve the use or attempted use of “physical 
force,” we have not said that bodily injury is always and only 
the result of physical force.  Cf. Middleton, 883 F.3d at 491 
(reasoning that the government “erroneously conflates the use 
of violent force with the causation of injury”).  To the 
contrary, and unlike the facts presented in Castleman, 
Chapman, or Ramos, Pennsylvania case law establishes that a 
person violates § 2702(a)(1) by causing “serious bodily 
injury,” regardless of whether that injury results from any 
physical force, let alone the type of violent force 
contemplated by the ACCA.  See Thomas, 867 A.2d at 597.  
Thus, we reject the government’s argument that a conviction 
                                                                                                     
“the use of a ‘substance’ … constitutes use of physical force, 
for federal law purposes, because the relevant force is the 
impact of the substance on the victim, not the impact of the 
user on the substance”). 
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under § 2701(a)(1) of Pennsylvania’s aggravated assault 
statute necessarily involves the use of physical force.  We 
conclude instead that § 2702(a)(1) lacks the element of 
violent physical force required by Johnson 2010. 
 
At least two of our sister circuits have reached a 
similar conclusion.  See Middleton, 883 F.3d at 491 
(concluding that South Carolina’s involuntary manslaughter 
offense is not an ACCA predicate under the elements clause 
“because it can be committed through a non-violent sale” of 
alcohol to a minor); United States v. Resendiz-Moreno, 705 
F.3d 203, 205 (5th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the first-degree 
cruelty to children under Georgia law is not a crime of 
violence under the guidelines because it can be committed 
“by depriving the child of medicine or by some other act of 
omission that does not involve the use of physical force”).  
The government’s position, however, is not without support.15  
                                              
15 Indeed, courts have divided on how far to extend 
Castleman.  See Villanueva, 893 F.3d at 128 (reading 
Castleman’s discussion of “force” as “focus[ing] on the 
causation of a consequence, rather than the physical act of 
initiating an action that leads to a consequence”); but see id. 
at 133, 136 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority 
“improperly extends [Castleman] to the very statutory 
context” that the Supreme Court has “specifically and 
repeatedly differentiated” and misreads it as shifting the focus 
from “force” to the “causation of a consequence”); see also 
United States v. Rice, 813 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 2016) 
(relying on Castleman and concluding that “intentionally or 
knowingly … caus[ing] physical injury” includes the requisite 
use of force under the guidelines (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted)); but see id. at 707 (Kelly, J., dissenting) 
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See United States v. Peeples, 879 F.3d 282, 287 (8th Cir. 
2018) (concluding that attempted murder under Iowa Code 
§ 707.11 is a crime of violence under the guidelines, and 
stating that omissions, such as a caregiver withholding food, 
can constitute the use of force under Castleman); United 
States v. Waters, 823 F.3d 1062, 1066 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(concluding that, under the guidelines, an omission such as 
“withholding medicine causes physical harm, albeit 
indirectly, and thus qualifies as the use of force under 
Castleman”).  But we do not consider the reasoning in those 
cases to be persuasive, because they conflate an act of 
omission with the use of force, something that Castleman, 
even if it were pertinent, does not support.  Cf. Castleman, 
134 S. Ct. at 1414-15 (likening “the act of employing poison 
knowingly as a device to cause physical harm” or firing a 
bullet at a victim, to “a kick or punch,” as each act involves 
the “application” or “use of force,” even though the resulting 
harm might occur indirectly). 
 
We recognize that the result we reach here is wholly 
unsatisfying and counterintuitive.  Cf. Ramos, 892 F.3d at 606 
(stating, “[i]t may appear counterintuitive that a defendant 
who actually uses physical force against another person when 
committing a felony does not, by definition, commit a violent 
crime under the elements clause,” but explaining that “the 
categorical approach, … is concerned only with the elements 
of the statute of conviction, not the specific offense conduct 
of an offender”).  It is hard to imagine that Congress meant 
                                                                                                     
(suggesting that in prior cases, “[a] number of courts and 
judges, including a clear plurality of the courts of appeals, 
ha[d] concluded that a person may cause physical or bodily 
injury without using violent force,” and listing cases). 
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for the kinds of crimes typically prosecuted as aggravated 
assault under state law to fall outside of the definition of 
“violent felony” in the ACCA.  But that’s the categorical 
approach for you.  See id. at 613 (acknowledging that 
“faithful application of the categorical approach at times 
results in outcomes that frustrate [the] policy objective” 
underlying a recidivist enhancement provision).  The element 
of serious bodily injury in § 2702(a)(1) will most likely be the 
result of a defendant’s use of violent physical force, as was 
undisputedly the case here.  But “most likely” does not satisfy 
the categorical approach, and logic dictates that the use of 
physical force required by the ACCA cannot be satisfied by a 
failure to act, which can be prosecuted under § 2702(a)(1).  
See Thomas, 867 A.2d at 597. 
 
In sum, because Pennsylvania aggravated assault under 
§ 2702(a)(1) criminalizes certain acts of omission, it sweeps 
more broadly than the ACCA’s definition of “physical force.”  
We are thus compelled to hold that Mayo’s conviction under 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(1) does not qualify as a predicate 
offense under the elements clause of the ACCA.   
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated, we will vacate the order 
denying Mayo’s motion to correct his sentence and remand 
the case for resentencing.  On remand, the District Court 
should address whether Mayo has any other ACCA predicate 
convictions.16  If not, and if, as Mayo represents, he has 
                                              
16 Without his aggravated assault conviction, Mayo 
appears to lack three qualifying convictions under the ACCA.  
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already served the ten-year statutory maximum sentence, he 
should be released, in accordance with the terms of 
supervision set forth in his judgment of conviction. 
                                                                                                     
Thus, we do not address at this time whether Mayo’s robbery 
convictions qualify under the ACCA’s elements clause. 
